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This paper  seeks  to  explain the observed relationship between  voluntary job 
turnover and  wages  over  the life  cycle.  To  this end,  a simple  job-matching 
model  is  analyzed in the case  where  a worker  has  better information  than a 
firm  about his potential productivity at the firm.  It is shown  that the 
resulting adverse  selection is capable of  explaining four  stylized facts of 
the labor market:  (1)  the secular  increase of wages  over  the life  cycle for 
both movers  and  stayers,  (2)  the flatter age-earnings  profiles  for  persistent 
job movers,  (3) the lower  wage  levels for  older men  who  are persistent job 
changers,  and  (4)  the positive relationship between  prior mobility and  future 
mobility. 
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The  determinants  of a workers'  income  have  always  been  of  interest to 
economists.  To  date,  several  studies have  investigated the empirical 
relationship between  wages  and  turnover.  Among  these are the findings  of 
Mincer  and  Jovanovic  (1981)  and  Bartel  and  Borjas  (1981).  These  authors  find 
that persistent job movers  have  flatter age-earnings  profiles.  They  also find 
that wages  for both movers  and  stayers increase over  the  life  cycle.  In 
addition,  Bartel and  Borjas  find that while mobility that takes  place early in 
the life  cycle may  pay,  individuals who  continue  to  move  later in  life  will 
have  lower  lifetime wage  growth compared  to workers  who  eventually stayed at  a 
firm.  They  also find that the average  past wages  of job changers  are  lower 
than  they are for job stayers.  The  findings of Mincer  and  Jovanovic 
complement  Bartel  and  Borjas'  study by  showing  that persistent mobility among 
older men  results in  actual  lower  wage  levels.  Mincer  and  Jovanovic also find 
the probability that a worker  changes  jobs increases  with the number  of 
previous  job changes. 
This paper  develops a model  of voluntary turnover  that is largely 
consistent with these  stylized facts.  A  notable  exception is  that the present 
model  is not able  to  explain why  mobility among  younger  workers  may  pay.  The 
conclusion  will give a possible explanation for this observation. 
Existing models  of turnover (permanent  job separations)  involve workers 
who  are changing  jobs because  they either receive  information regard.ing their 
current job match  or possible alternative matches  that will lead to  higher 
earnings.  Jovanovic  (1979a)  presents  a model  of job turnover  that partially 
explains the above  phenomena.  In  Jovanovic's model,  workers  change  jobs 
hoping  to  obtain a better match  with another  firm.  Since persistent 
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explains  why  frequent  job changers  have  lower  average  past earnings.  However, 
Jovanovic  concedes  that his model  does  not explain why  persistent job movers 
have  lower  future earnings.  Similarily,  his model  does  not attempt  to  explain 
why  prior mobility is  an  indicator of future mobility. 
One  possible explanation for these  phenomena  is to assume  that workers 
have  different propensities  to  change  jobs.  This  will tautologically imply 
that workers  who  have  moved  frequently in the past will be  more  likely to  move 
again at any  point in  the future.  If firm-specific human  capital  is 
introduced,  this model  will also imply that wages  will increase over  the life 
cycle and  that workers  with a high propensity to change  jobs  will invest in 
less firm-specific human  capital and  have  flatter wage  profiles  over  time. 
However,  there is  no a priori reason (assuming  there are enough  firms that do 
not require firm-specific human  capital) why  these  workers  would  have  lower 
average  wages.  Similarly, if firms do not incur training costs when  hiring 
workers,  then a better determinant of a worker's future  wages  can  be  obtained 
by  replacing prior mobility by  a worker's age  and  current tenure at a firm. 
If  there are training costs,  then,  since frequent  movers  would  incur  these 
costs more  often,  and  would  thus earn lower  wages  on  average.  There  are  two 
reasons one  might  think this is  not a good  explanation for the relationship 
between  wages  and  turnover.  One  is that mobility is  determined exogenously  in 
this model.  A  satisfactory explanation of the relationship between  turnover 
and  wages  mobility would have  to  be  determined  endogenously  as  a property of 
the equilibrium.  The  other reason  this might not be  a good  description of the 
labor market  is that it  does  not adequately explain why  job movers  have  lower 
wages  in  the early part of their careers.  This model  is  essentially the one 
developed by  Salop and  Salop  (1976).  They  determined  that when  a worker's 
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would post bonds  at firms in  order to  separate  themselves  from the infrequent 
job movers.  This  will imply that the wage  rates for job movers  should  be 
higher  than  that of job stayers  in the early part of their careers. 
The  present  paper  attempts  to  explain these phenomena  without exogenously 
assuming  that workers'  have  different propensities  to  change  jobs.  The  model 
also ignores  firm  specific human  capital  since it  does  not adequately  explain 
the stylized facts of the labor market.  Including it in  the analysis would 
not alter.the res-ults  of the present model. 
The  model  presented here  is a basic  job-matching model  where  a worker's 
productivity varies across  tasks or firms.  The  feature which  distinguishes 
this from similar studies is that a worker's productivity consists of  both a 
firm-specific (matching)  component  and  an  individual  specific component.  The 
individual component  is  assumed  to  be  observable only by  the worker.  This 
informational  asymmetry  leads  to  problems  of adverse  selection.  As  is 
standard,  two different types of equilibria can  occur:  a separating 
equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium.  It is shown  that when  there is enough 
variability in the productivity of workers  a pure pooling equilibrium 
results.  This  statement  is true even  though  workers  can  post bonds  as  in 
Salop  and  Salop's model. 
The  existence of a pooling equilibrium implies  that the frequent job 
changers  will be  the lower  productivity workers  according  to  Akerlof's  lemon 
principle.  Job  movers  will then have  lower  wages  on  average  compared  with 
infrequent job movers.  In  equilibrium,  bonds  will also be  posted in  order  to 
transfer income  away  from the frequent  job movers  (the  low productivity 
workers)  to  the infrequent job movers  (the high productivity workers).  This 
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selection,  job movers  may  also experience wage  increases over  the life cycle. 
Since  frequent job movers  are  the low productivity workers,  it  is shown  that 
this heterogeneity may  be  able to  explain the positive correlation between 
prior mobility and  future mobility. 
Other  effects of adverse  selection are also examined.  It is shown  that 
there is less aggregate mobility with adverse  selection than would  exist in  a 
model  without asymmetric  informatjon.  It is also shown,  however,  that a 
government  cannot  improve  welfare by  subsidizing mobility.  In  fact, 
subsidizing mobility would have  no effect on  either mobility or a worker's net 
wages  over  time. 
The  paper  is  organized as  follows:  In  section 11,  the assumptions  of the 
model  are  stated and  discussed.  Section I11 discusses  the model  and  gives an 
example  to  motivate the paper's results.  Section IV defines  a pooling 
equilibrium for this economy  and  characterizes  the equilibrium.  Questions of 
existence are postponed until the end  of section V.  Section V shows  that a 
pooling equilibrium leads  to  problems  of adverse  selection and  that these 
problems  can  explain the relationship between  turnover and  wages.  Another 
example  is then presented to  illustrate these  results and motivate  the 
conditions necessary  to  insure  the existence of a pooling equilibrium.  The 
section then concludes  by  proving that a pooling equilibrium exists for this 
economy,  and  that in  equilibrium bonds  wi  11  be  posted by workers  which  is 
indexed on  their future mobility.  Section VI discusses  the question of 
optimality in  the model.  Section VII provides  concluding remarks  and  possible 
extensions for future research. 
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The  basic  structure of the model  is similar to Jovanovic  (1979a).  The 
productivity of a worker  consists of a job-matching component,  8,  which  is 
match  specific.  However,  a worker's productivity differs from Jovanovic's 
model  in  that it  also consists of an  individual-specific component,  p. 
Frequently p wi  11  be  referred to  as  the "base productivity level" of  a 
worker.  For  mathematical  simp1  ici  ty,  we  assume  a simple  1  inear production 
function  where  a worker's productivity is  given by  y  =  p +  8.  The  fol lowing 
restrictions are placed on  the distributions of p and 8:  p is  assumed  to  be 
distributed on  the interval  Cp',  p"l with a c.d.f.  of F(p)  and  a d.f.  of  f(p); 
8 is assumed  to  be  distributed on  the interval [-el,  8"l with a c.d.f. 
of  G(8)  and  a d.f.  of g(8)  with E(8)  =  0  and  cov(p,  8) =  0.  It  is 
also assumed  that 8  is i.i.d.  across  different individuals and  also i.i.d. 
for  an  individual  across  different jobs.  This  implies that a worker's  current 
job match  does  not provide the worker  with any  information regarding his match 
at another  firm.  Similarly,  the quality of another  worker's match does  not 
provide a worker  with any  information regarding his own  job match  at another 
firm. 
The  following informational  restrictions are placed on  the model :  A 
worker's  base  productivity level  is  assumed  to  be  known  only by  the worker. 
Prior to  production,  neither firms nor  workers  know  what  a worker's  job match 
will be  at a firm.  However,  after  working one  period the worker's 
productivity at the firm,  y,  is  assumed  to  be  perfectly observable by  both the 
worker and  the firm.  Furthermore,  it  is assumed  that a worker's output at a 
firm  is  constant over  time and  that this output cannot  be  observed by other 
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and  prior moves. 
The  following model  is  a three-period model.  Workers  are assumed  to  live 
and  work  for  three periods  indexed  by 0,  1,  2.  At the end  of periods  0  and  1 
a worker  decides  whether  to  continue  working at his present  job or to  change 
jobs. 
The  next  section provides a heuristic discussion of the model  and  shows 
that when  contingent wage  contracts are allowed,  the model  cannot adequately 
explain the stylized facts of the  labor market.  An  example  is then developed 
for  the case  where  contingent wage  contracts are not allowed.  The  example  is 
used  to  motivate  the paper's main  contention that the resulting adverse 
selection can  help explain the observed relationship between  turnover  and 
wages. 
111.  The  Model:  A  Discussion 
Without any  restrictions on  the type of  wage  contracts that firms can 
offer,  the wage  contract that would  emerge  from this model  would have  workers 
being paid their realized output,  y,  at a firm  after every period.  This 
results since firms do not know  a worker's  base  productivity level;  contingent 
wage  contracts occur  so  that workers  with different productivities would not 
be  confused  in equilibrium.  This result is due  to  the assumption  of risk 
neutrality.  We  then  show  that if contingent  wage  contracts are allowed,  the 
model  will collapse down  to  a simple  version of a standard  job-matching 
model.  This  can  be  seen  by considering that the expected wage  for a worker  at 
the beginning of  period zero,  or after a job change  would  just be  his base 
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value of the future wage  payments  at the beginning of  period zero for a worker 
with a base  productivity level of p,  gives  the following value  function: 
W(p>  =  p +  REmax[X(p),  V(y)l 
where, 
X(p> =  p +  REmaxCp,  p+81 
v(y)  =  y(i +  6). 
The  expected present discounted  value at the beginning of period one  for a 
worker  who  changed  jobs after the  initial period,  is X;  the present 
discounted value of future wages'at the beginning of  period one  for workers 
who  stayed at their present  job,  is defined  to  be  V(y).  Since  information 
about a worker's  job match  is perfectly observable  after  only one  period,  a 
worker  who  does  not move  after period zero will never  change  jobs. 
It  is easy  to  see  that the equilibrium for this simple  job-matching model 
implies that the probability that a worker  moves  after either period zero or 
one  is  the same  for all workers.  If we  further assume  that 8  is uniformly 
distributed over  the interval  [-el,  8'1  and  R=l,  then the probability that 
a worker moves  after period zero would be  9/16,  and  the probability that a 
worker moves  after period one,  given he  moved  after period zero,  would be 
1/2.2 
Since every  worker  has  the same  probability of  moving,  this simple model 
cannot capture  the heterogeneity  that is  necessary  to  explain why  prior 
mobility is  an  indicator of future mobility.  At first glance,  the model  does 
seem  capable of explaining why  wages  increase for  both movers  and  stayers over 
the life  cycle,  albeit at a  slower rate for job movers.  Job  stayers would 
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their first-period  employer.  Similarly,  job movers  also experience a wage 
increase.  This  is  because  they get paid their realized productivity at a firm 
at the end  of  period zero,  and  because  job movers  are  the workers  with a bad 
match at their previous  employer.  That  is, their ex  post wage  would  be  less 
than their base  productivity level,  p
3.  However,  since the quality of 
matches  for job movers  is not as  good  as  the quality of  the matches  for  job 
stayers,  movers  would  experience$less  of  a wage  increase  than would  job 
stayers. 
This  explanation,  however,  cannot  be  complete,  since age  and  tenure are 
driving the results,  and  not the number  of  previous moves.  That  is,  the 
reason future wages  are lower  for  job changers  than they are for  job stayers, 
is  because  the expected quality of  future matches  is lower  for  job movers  than 
the realized matches  of job stayers.  Therefore,  what  drives this result is 
not the number  of prior moves  that a worker  experiences,  but the age  and 
tenure of  a worker.  Workers  with the same  amount  of tenure and  the  same 
number  of periods until retirement,  will, on average,  have  the same  expected 
future wage  rates.4  Empirical  work  on  the relationship between mobility and 
wages  has  control  led for differences  in age  and  tenure,  and  has  found  frequent 
mobility results in  lower  average  wage  levels for older workers.  Since 
traditional job matching models  cannot  explain why  prior mobility and  future 
mobility are positively correlated,  or why  job movers  have  lower average 
future wages,  it  will be  assumed  that wages  cannot  be  made  contingent on  the 
ex  post output of workers.  This assumption  is  motivated by  the observation 
that most  wage  contracts are not contingent on a worker's  future output.  In  a 
model  with risk aversion,  this assumption  can  be  justified. 
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ability to  have  the possibility a pooling equilibrium for the above  economy. 
A  pooling equilibrium leads  to  problems  of adverse  selection,  in  that low 
productivity workers  will be  the frequent job changers.  This  occurs  since 
lower  productivity workers  gain from being confused with the higher 
productivity workers  when  changing  jobs.  To  see  this,  consider  the following 
example: 
Example  1  : 
The  following example  assumes  that there are two types  of workers  and 
three possible outputs that each  worker  can  have  at a firm.  The  productivity 
types and  the matching components  are given as  follows: 
P  f  (p>  8  g(8>  B= 1 
1  112  -  1  1  I3  - 
-  -  0  113  - 
2  112  1  1  I3  - 
Consider  first, a candidate equilibrium where  no bonds  are posted,  that 
is,  where  a worker's  wage  in  every period is just the firm's estimate of his 
productivity at the firm.  With  this assumption  the following prices and 
quantities can  be  verified: 
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workers  who  changed  jobs  after the initial period;  w,  is the second  period 
wage  for workers  who  changed  jobs after both periods zero and  one;  w,(y>  is 
the second  period wage  for workers  who  did not change  jobs after  period zero, 
but who  subsequently  changed  jobs after  the first period.  Since  the first 
period wage  for a job changer  is the worker's realized output,  y,  the wage  for 
a worker  who  then changes  jobs after period one  is a function of the worker's 
output at his first  period employer.  In this simple example,  a worker  who  did 
not change  jobs after the initial period would never  change  jobs;  since 
w2(y)  <  y,  that is,  he  could earn more  by  staying employed  at his initial 
employer.  The  wages  for job stayers are not made  explicit in the above  table 
since they are  simply a worker's realized output,  y,.  yr(p)  is  defined to 
be  the reservation output of  a worker  with a base  productivity level of p, 
that is,  the output level at which  a worker  is  indifferent to staying at his 
period zero employer  or changing  jobs.  G(yr(p)-p>  is thus  the fraction of 
the productivity p  workers  who  change  jobs  after  period zero,  and  G(w,-p)  is 
the fraction of  these  workers  who  also change  jobs after period one. 
If this were  an  equilibrium,  the low productivity workers  would  be  moving 
twice as  often as  the high productivity workers;  213  (113)  of  the  low  (high) 
productivity workers move  after period zero,  and  213  (113)  move  again after 
period one.  This is  a direct result of adverse  selection.  However,  because 
of the difference in  mobility between  the high-  and  low- productivity workers 
this cannot  be  an  equilibrium;  a firm could earn positive profits by  competing 
away  the high-productivity workers.  Since high-productivity workers  move  only 
half as  often as  the low-productivity workers,  the following bonding  scheme 
would attract the high-productivity workers:  requiring workers  to  post bonds 
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workers'  future mobility,  where  movers  would  forfeit the bond  and  the  job 
stayers  would  split the proceeds  of the bond  among  them.  Since  the 
high-productivity workers  move  infrequently,  this clearly benefits them. 
Bonds  act to  redistribute to the high-productivity workers part of  the income 
which  the low-productivity workers  gain because  of adverse  selection.  We 
define  .bt  to  be  the bonus  paid to  a worker  in  period t, with n previous 
job changes,  (that is,  the wage  a worker  receives in  period t  above  his output 
at  a firm.)  These  bonuses  are funded  by  workers'  posting bonds  when  they 
become  employed  at a new  firm.  Bonds  are implicit in  the wage  functons,  so 
that w,  will no  longer be  the firm's estimate of a worker's productivity. 
The  following can  be  verified to  be  an  equi 1  i  brium for this example. 
In  brackets are  the values  that result when  wages  can  be  made  contingent 
on a workers'  output. 
This  is  an  equilibrium since potential firms cannot  compete  away  either 
the low-productivity workers or the high-productivity workers.  The  low 
productivity workers  are  still being confused with the high productivity 
workers  and  thus do better than  they would  in  autarky.  It  can  also be  shown 
that if the amount  of the bonds  that workers  have  to  post were  changed,  the 
high-productivity workers  would be  made  worse  off.' 
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selection is  present in the model  since 213  (113)  of the  low  (high) 
productivity workers  move  after period zero,  and  213  (113)  of these  will  move 
again after the first  period.  Because  of this,  the example  illustrates the 
stylized facts of the labor market.  The  wages  for job movers  and  job stayers 
increase over  the  life  cycle (although  at a slower  rate for job movers).  In 
addition,  job movers  do  worse  on  average  than do  job stayers.  Notice also 
that the increase in  wages  for movers  is  not monotonic  over  time,  but reaches 
a maximum  in  period one  and  drops  off slightly in  the  last period.  Workers 
who  move  twice continue to  earn more  in the last period of their working  life 
than they did in  the first  period,  however,  their wages  decreased  with their 
last job move.  This is consistent with the findings of Bartel  and  Borjas:  for 
young men  a quit is  associated with an  increase in  earnings but for  the older 
men  a  quit has  either a negative or zero effect on  wage  growth. 
It  can  also be  seen  from the example  that prior mobility is  an  indicator 
of future mobile.  The  probability that a worker  changes  jobs  in the first 
period is 112,  while the conditional probability that a worker  changes  jobs  in 
the second  period,  given that he  changed  jobs  in  the first period,  is 519.  In 
contrast,  the probabilities when  productivity is  public information are 213 
and  113,  respectively. 
IV.  Equilibrium 
In  this section,  we  define a Pooling Equilibrium for the environment given 
in the previous  section.  There  are assumed  to  be  a large number  of  firms  and 
workers.  Firms  are imagined  to  compete  over different sets of contracts in 
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that another  contract or set of  contracts does  not exist which,  if  offered 
could make  positive profits,  taking the behavior of other firms as  given. 
The  equilibrium notion employed  is thus  a Nash  equilibrium concept. 
The  remainder  of the definition states that workers  maximize  their utility 
or present discounted value of their future wage  payments.  After  every 
period,  a worker must  decide  whether  to  move  or to  continue working for his 
present firm.  The  decision whether  to  move  or to  stay for  a worker  at the end 
of  period t, with n previous  job changes,  wi  11  be  denoted  by  m(p,y,n,t)  where 
n,t={O,l)  and  n  t.  A  worker  bases  his decision on  his output,  y,  at  his 
present firm  and  his base  productivity level,  p.  We  define m=O  to  denote  the 
decision to  stay at the present job and  m=l  to  denote  the decision to  change 
jobs.  Workers  are assumed  to take wages  as  given when  making  their decisions, 
but in  equilibrium wages  will be  a function of the optimal-decision rules of 
workers,  ml(p,y,n,t)  =  (0 or 1).  For  notational brevity,  the functional 
dependence  on p and y  will be  suppressed.  Wages  are denoted by  w,(.>  where 
t =  {0,1,2)  and  (.  >  denotes  the i  nformation-set of the firm at the 
beginning of time t, (that is,  the past wages  and  prior moves  of workers.) 
The  dependence  on past wages  will be  suppressed,  except when  a worker's 
previous wage  gives his realized output at a firm. 
To  define an  equilibrium we  denote  A  to  be  the law of  motion for the 
economy.  A,(n,t>  is the fraction of workers  who  will change  jobs at the 
end of period t, given that they changed  jobs n times  previously.  The 
subscript i denotes  the information set available to  the firm  at the beginning 
of  period i. We  now  have  the following definition: 
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of  wages:  {w,,  wl (mt(0,0)=0,y>,  w,  (ml(O,O)=l,  w2(m'(0,0)=0,m'(0,1  )=O,y), 
w2(m1(0,0~=0,m'(0,1)=1,y~,  w2(m'(0,0~=l,m'(l,l)=Oy),  w2(m'(0,0)=l,m'(l,l)=1)) 
value functions:  {W(p,y,n,t)  n=0,1;  t=0,1,2;  n<t) and  equations of  motion: 
{hi(n,t)  i=0,1;  n=0,1;  n -  <  t) such  that 
sati  sfy: 
where, 
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and  such  that firms earn zero expected profits: 
and  such  that: 
12)  there does  not exist a new  contract or set of contracts,  which if 
offered,  would make  positive profits. 
The  definition of equilibrium consists of  consumers  maximizing utility 
given prices 1-3  and  a zero profit condition for firms 8-11. 
Given  that firms earn zero profits,  there are a continuum of wage 
contracts which  solve 8-11.  However,  it  will be  shown  later that there exists 
only one  contract that also satisfies 12.  Obvious  simplications in  notation 
and  recalling the definition of .bt  gives: 
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model.  A  worker  who  changes  jobs  in the first  period will change  jobs  again 
in  the second  period if w,(y>  >  y +  obz, that is, if he  earns  more  at a 
new  firm.  Similarly,  a worker  who  does  not change  jobs  after the end of the 
period zero will only change  jobs  again if w2  >  y +  lbr.  Given  these 
rules,  the value functions given in 2)  and  3) become: 
Recalling the definitions of V(y>,  and  X(p>  from the previous  section,  yields: 
Before  determining the optimal  decision rule for a worker,  that is, 
whether  or not to  change  jobs at the end  of period zero,  we  will need  the 
following definition and  lemmas: 
Definition:  yr(p> is defined to  be  the output at which  a worker  with a base 
productivity level of p is indifferent between  staying at his present  job or 
leaving after the end  of period zero. 
yr(p> +  +  Bma~[y~(p>+~b~  ,w2(yr(p)) I  = 
wl +  BEmaxCp+8+lbz,w21 
where, 
yr(p') =  p' +  8 if V(p1+8> >  X(pl)  for  all 8. 
yr(p"> =  p" +  8 if V(pM+8)  <  X(pM) for all 8. 
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yr(p> is  a reservation output  in that for all y  <  (>)  yr(p) 
y +  +  Bma~[y+~b~  ,wz(y)l <  (>) w,  +  BEmax[p+B+,b,  ,wzl 
Proof:  The  reservation property of yr(p)  above  follows  from the monotonicity of V(y> 
in  y.  This  is satisfied since both y and  w,(y>  increase  with y. 
1  / 
The  decision whether  or not to change  jobs  after period zero,  depends  on 
the  inequality V(y)  <(>)  X(p).  The  optimal  decision rules for the worker 
are  then: 
ml(p,y,O,O)  =  O(1) iff  yo >  (<)  yr(p) 
ml(p,y,O,l)  =  O(1)  iff yo >  (0  wz(y) -  O~Z 
ml(p,y,l,l)  =  O(1)  iff y,  >  (<)  wz -  Ibz 
These  rules can  be  substituted into the equilibrium wage  rates and  laws  of 
motion.  The  next  lemma  gives equivalent  expressions  for the  value  function 
W(p,y,l,2),  the laws  of motion A,(n,t>,  and  the expected  value of the 
productivity of job changers. 
Lemma  2: 
1)  Ao(0,O)  =  ,fG(yr(p)-p)f(p>dp 
2)  A,(  1 ,l)  =  .fG(yr(p)-p)G(~z-p-l bz)f(p)dp 
3)  A~(O,I  )  = J-IG(YI-P)  - G(Y~(P)-P) lf(p)dp 
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6)  E(plmt  (O,O)=l  ,m1(1 ,l  )=I)  =  JpG(y'(p)-p)G(~2-p-~ b2)f(p)/A,,(l,  1) 
7)  E(plp+9=y,m1(O,O)=O)  =  w2(y) =  SP'V'pf(plp+B=y)dplK 
where, 
yr(p(y>>  =  y 
K =  .fP'"'f(plp+B=y)dp 
w2(y1) =  y' +  Ob2 
Proof:  See  Appendix  1. 
/ / 
The  intuition behind these  equalities can  be  gotten from Lemma  1.  The 
necessary condition for a worker  to  change  jobs after  period zero is y<yr(p> 
or B<yr(p)-p.  G(yr(p)-p)  is then  the fraction of the productivity, p, 
workers  who  change  jobs after the initial period,  while G(yr(p)-p)f(p)lAo(O,O) 
is the proportion of these  job changers  with a base  productivity level of p. 
The  intuition behind 2  and  6  is  similar to that above,  but now  the firm 
has  two pieces of information.  The  firm  estimates p on  the conditions 
necessary for a worker  to  change  jobs in  both periods:  Bo<yr(p)-p,  and 
9,<w2-p-,b2,  where  the subscripts  1  and  2  represent different draws  of 
8.  Since these  draws  are  i.i.d.,  G(yr(p~-p)G(w2-p-lb2>f(p)/Ao(l,l)  is 
the proportion of the productivity,  p,  workers  who  change  jobs both periods and may 
be  interpreted as  a density function. 
In  the next section,  we  show  that a pooling equilibrium leads  to adverse 
selection and  this adverse  selection can  explain the relationship between  turnover 
and  wages.  It  will then be  shown  that an  equilibrium exists for this 
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that,  in equilibrium,  workers  will post bonds  that are indexed  according to 
their future mobility. 
V.  Job  Mobility and  Adverse  Selection 
In  a model  with perfect information,  or when  wages  can  be  made  contingent 
on  the output of the worker,  all workers  will have  the same  propensity to 
change  jobs.  Adverse  selection is  present  when  low-productivity workers  have 
a higher probability of changing  jobs  than do  high-productivity workers. 
Since G(yr(p)-p)  is the fraction of  workers  with a productivity of p who 
change  jobs in  the first  period,  the proof of  adverse  selection is that this 
is  a  decreasing in  a worker's productivity, p.  The  proof relies on  whether 
dyr(p)/dp  <  1.  Adverse  selection is  present in the market  for workers 
switching jobs  again in the second  period,  since G(w2-p-,b2)  is the 
fraction of workers  with a productivity,  p,  who  change  jobs in the second 
period,  which  is  obviously decreasing in  p.  This effect is  accentuated by  the 
model's  finite horizon. 
The  next proposition proves  that adverse  selection is  present  in this 
1  abor market . 
Proposition 1: 
dyr(p>ldp <  1  for  all p. 
Proof:  From  the definition of yr(p>,  Theorem  1,  and  Lemma  2: 
V(yr(p> =  yr(p)  +  Bma~Cy~(p)+~b~,  w2(yr)I 
=  X(p)  =  w  +  BEmaxCp+B+,b2,  w21 
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sufficient to  show  that dX(p)/dp  <  1.  Differentiating X  yields: 
dX(p)/dp  =  B(~=G(w~-P-~  b2))  <  1. 
/ / 
Adverse  selection results because  the lower-productivity workers  move  more 
often due  to the potential for confusing  them  with the higher-productivi  ty 
workers.  The  job-matching component  of a worker's productivity provides  the 
necessary  noise  to  insure that mobility exists in  equilibrium.  The  key to 
adverse selection is that the wage  rates w,  and  w,  are not conditional on 
the output of the worker. 
Adverse  selection also implies that wages  for job changers  will be  lower 
on  average  than the wages  for  job stayers. 
Theorem 1: 
The  average  future  wages  (output)  of workers  who  do not change  jobs are 
greater than  the wages  of  workers  who  change  jobs once  after the initial 
period,  and  of workers  who  change  jobs after both periods. 
a)  Ep  ,e(V(y>  ly >  yr(p))  >  EP(X(p) ly<yr(p)) 
b)  E{w2(m1  (O,O)=l  ,m' (1,l )=O,y))  >  Wr 
Proof: 
a)  Ep ,e(V(y)  ly>yr(p)) =  S{yr,p  ,SV(y>h(y>dyl(  1-H(yr(p))))f(p)dp 
>  SV(yr(p))f(p>dp =  SX(p>f(p)dp 
>  SX(p>G(yr(p)-p>f(p)dp/~o(O,O) 
=  EP[X(p>  ly<yr(p)l 
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cov(G(yr(p)-p),p)  <  0 -- that is, mobility and  productivity are negatively 
related. 
b)  Follows  from the definition of w,. 
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There  are two reasons  why  future wages  are lower  for job changers.  One  is 
the standard effect in  finite horizon job-matching models.  As  mentioned  in 
the previous  section,  this effect is  due  to  the age  and  tenure of a worker. 
The  second  effect is  due  to  the low-productivity workers  being the frequent 
job changers.  Mobility acts as  a signal  to  firms of  a worker's potential 
productivity at the firm.  This effect is  not dependent on  (although 
accentuated by)  the assumption of a finite horizon.  In  more  general  models, 
which  include human  capital,  including a worker's  age  and  tenure would not be 
a proxy for a worker's prior mobility. 
To  show  why  adverse  selection can  help explain why  prior mobility is  an 
indicator of future  mobility,  Proposition 1 has  to  be  employed.  To  see  why 
this model  might be  able to  explain the positive correlation between  the 
number  of past job changes  and  the probability of  changing  jobs  in any 
subsequent  period,  recall that the frequent  job changers  are  the 
lower-productivity workers  who  have  a higher  propensity to  change  jobs. 
However,  in  conjunction with this is an  opposing  effect.  Since  workers  who 
change  jobs  in the first period are primarily the lower-productivity workers, 
their wages  and  thus  incentives to  change  jobs  in  the future are lower.  A 
similar effect is present in  any  job-matching model  with a finite horizon 
since the expected benefits  of future matches  decrease with age. 
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a)  The  probability that a worker  changes  jobs  at the end  of  period one,  given 
that he  changed  jobs after the end  of  period zero,  is greater than it  would be 
if adverse  selection were  not present or,  equivalently, if the distribution of 
the productivity of workers  who  have  changed  jobs before  was  identical  to  the 
original distribution of workers,  f(p),  then A,(l,l>  >  SG(w2-p)f(p)dp. 
b)  Without adverse  selection,  the fraction  of workers  who  change  jobs after 
period zero is greater than the fraction of these workers  who  change  jobs 
again after the first period,  SG(yr(p)-p)f(p)dp  <  .fG(w~-p-~  b2)f(p)dp. 
Proof: 
a)  Ao(  1 ,l  )  =  E{G(yr-p)G(w2-p-  b2  )} 
>  E{G(~'-~))E{G(W~-~-~  b,))  =  Ao(O,O)AI  (1,1) 
The  proof re1  ies on  cov{G(yr-p)G(w2-p-I  b2>)  >  0.  This  fol  lows 
from Proposition 1. 
b)  The  proof follows from Lemma  2  and  the definition of w2. 
The  first  inequality reflects the additional  information about  a worker's 
productivity that is gained from knowing  that a worker  has  changed  jobs  in  the 
preceding period.  It says  that the unconditional  probability that a worker 
with a base  productivity level of p  moves  in the first  period is positively 
correlated with the probability that the worker  will move  during the last 
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fact that job mobility decreases  with age  in  a finite horizon model,  as  the 
benefits of  moving  decrease  over  time.  If the first  effect dominates,  then 
the following inequality will hold: 
This  will give the desired result.  The  probability of changing  jobs 
increases  with the number  of previous  job changes. 
This  result is,  in  general,  not true.  It  will be  true,  however,  when 
yr(p)  and  w,  are approximately  equal,  or,  in  the many-period case,  when 
the reservation outputs  in  succeeding periods are nearly equal."  The 
intuition behind this result is that a pool  of workers  who  have  changed  jobs 
many  times  previously will be  composed  primarily of the low productivity 
workers  who  have  a higher  propensity to  change  jobs.  However,  the force  that 
helps counteract  this result is that since this pool  of workers  will primarily 
be  the low productivity workers,  they  will earn a lower  wage if  they change 
jobs,  reducing the incentives for mobility. 
Example  2: 
The  following example  is a two-period version of the model  presented 
above.  The  matching  component,  8,  is assumed  to  be  uniformly distributed 
between  -8'  and  8'.  Following Example  1,  a candidate  equilibrium for  this 
example  can  be  obtained by  choosing a wage-bonus  package  (w,  b)  which 
maximizes  the expected return of the highest productivity worker. 
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In  Appendix  2  the solution to  Problem E is shown  to  satisfy: 
b  =  w2 +  pa' -  2E(p)  if 2(E(p>-pU>,8'. 
b =  wZ +  8'12 -  E(pIp<p,)  otherwise 
where, 
E(plp<pl -  PI  =  -8'12 
If we  further assume  that p-UCB' , 28' I,  then b =  w2-pa, and  from 
Lemma  2, the corresponding  prices and  quantities are: 
A  =  114  b=9' I3  wl  =  58'14 
w2  =  48'13  G(w2-p-b)  =  1 -  pI28' 
The  assumption  that 9  is uniformly distributed is  not necessary  to 
derive b =  w2-p'.  All that is  necessary is for p  to  be  uniformly 
distributed.  Before  verifying that this is an  equilibrium for  this example, 
notice that it  is consistent with the stylized facts;  workers  experience a 
wage  increase when  they change  jobs,  yet they earn  less over  time than  job 
s  tayers  . 
Propos i  ti  on 2  : 
The  above  are the equilibrium prices and  allocations for this example. 
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The  proof proceeds  in two  steps.  The  first  step establishes that there 
does  not exist a new  contract that could  compete  to  hire away  a subgroup  of 
the higher productivity workers,  [ph,  pH].  The  second  step is to  show  that 
there does  not exist a feasible contract which could attract a subgroup  of the 
lower productivity workers,  Cp' , pL  I. 
The  first  step can  be  established as  follows.  The  necessary conditions 
for a contract  to  attract the higher productivity workers  are dXh(p)/dp  > 
dx(p>/dp and  Xh(ph) =  X(ph).  That  is, the marginal  worker  is 
indifferent between  the two contracts and  the higher productivity workers  must 
strictly prefer the new  contract.  Using Proposition 1 these  conditions  imply: 
Since a property of the proposed equilibrium is that the highest 
productivity worker  never moves,  the above  condition,also implies that he 
would never move  with the new  contract.  Therefore,  if the highest 
productivity worker  is  to  prefer this contract,  we  must  have: 
Wh  +  Wzh  >  W  +  W2 
To  establish a contradiction,  we  now  show  that the  lowest productivity 
worker  under  this condition also prefers the new  contract: 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyThis  establishes  the contradiction,  which proves  that a group of  the 
higher-productivity workers  cannot  be  competed  away.  The  rest of the proof 
shows  that a feasible  contract cannot  compete  away  a group of  the 
lower-productivity workers.  For  a contract to  attract a  subgroup  of the 
lower-productivity workers  there must  exist some  marginal  worker,  p,,  such 
that XL(pL>  =  X(pL).  Since  the highest productivity worker  of this 
subgroup  is pL from Problem  E,  the best contract for the marginal  worker  is 
given by  bL =  wZL -  pl.  Therefore,  establishing that this contract is not 
preferred by  a worker  with a productivity level of  p,  implies that 
X,(p,  <  X(pL). 
WL  +  Emax[pL+B+bL,  w2,1 
=  WL  +  w~~  +  EmaxCp,+B-p',  01 
<  w  +  wz  +  EmaxCpL+B-pl,Ol 
=  w  +  EmaxCp,+B+w,-p1,w2l 
=  w  +  EmaxCpL+B+b,  w,I 
The  next to  last step uses  the feasibility condition,  WL  =  E(p(p <  pL) - 
(1-AL)b  <  E(p)  +  Aw,,  which follows  since AL  <  A. 
This establishes  the contention that there does  not exist a feasible 
contract to  attract a subgroup  of the  lower-productivity workers. 
The  key  to the proof  is that the allocation that satisfying Problem E 
implies is that the highest productivity worker  never  changed  jobs.  A 
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to  be  enough  variability in the productivity types of the workers  to insure 
that the highest productivity workers  never  change  jobs.  In this example,  it 
amounts  to  assuming  that pH-p1 2 8'.  If this condition does  not hold,  we 
may  not have  an  equilibrium in this model.  This  is identical  to the problems 
of nonexistence  encountered  in the literature.  (See,  for example,  Rothschild 
and  Stiglitz, Riley 119751,  and  Wilson  L19771.)  If we  adopt  Wilson's 
nonmyopic  equilibrium concept,  so  that firms take into account  that a new 
contract might imply some  of the existing contracts  will be  withdrawn,  then 
existence can  again be  proven.  The  equilibrium in  this case  typically 
involves a pooling equilibrium for a finite number  of subgroups. 
We  are  oow  ready to  prove a sufficient condition for the existence of  a 
pooling equilibrium in  this model.  The  major  difference between  the following 
theorem  and  the preceding example  is the  inclusion of the third period.  The 
theorem also establishes  that bonds  will be  posted  in  equilibrium. 
Theorem  3: 
If p-UCpl,  p"1 and if there is "enough" dispersion in  workers' 
productivity types,  then a pooling equilibrium will exist for this model. 
Furthermore,  a characteristic of this equilibrium is that workers  will post 
bonds  indexed on  their future mobility such  that the highest productivity 
worker  will never move. 
Proof:  See  Appendix  3 
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model.  The  distribution on p can  be  arbitrary as  long as  it  is  not "too" 
skewed  to  the right.  With a two-period model,  existence can  be  established by 
just assuming  "enough"  dispersion in  p.  Sufficient variability is  assumed  so 
that the highest productivity worker  will never  move. 
There  are  two reasons  why  a separating equilibrium for this model  is,  in 
general,  not possible.  The  first  is that the benefits to  the low-productivity 
workers  to  pass  themselves  off as  high-productivity workers  can  be  quite large 
in  a multiperiod model.  This occurs  since future employers  can  observe  a 
worker's  productivity by his choice of  an  initial wage  contract.  The 
assumption  that there is "enough" dispersion in  p insures  that the benefits 
from lying are  large enough  so  that the low-productivity workers  always  prefer 
a pooling contract.  The  second  reason  why  a separating equilibrium is,  in 
general,  not possible is that the mobility of workers  is endogenously 
determined.  This does  not allow us  to  use  Riley's theorems  to  establish 
sufficient conditions for a separating equilibrium.  The  standard models  for a 
separating equilibrium to  exist (see,  for example,  Spence  C19731,  Rothschild 
and  Stiglitz C19761,  Wilson  C19771,  etc.)  depends  on  the assumption  that some 
unobservable  characteristic is  correlated with something  that is observable. 
It is  natural  to  argue  that mobility plays  that role in the current model  as 
it  did in  Salop  and  Salop's.  However,  in  the present model,  a worker's 
propensity to  move  is a property of the equilibrium; it  is  not determined 
exogenously  as  was  the risk type of consumers  in  Rothschild and  Stiglitz's 
model. 
The  next section discusses  questions of  optimality of the model. 
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The  preceding examples  illustrated another  aspect of the model:  In 
equilibrium there is  less job mobility than occurs  in  a world with perfect 
information,  or when  wages  can  be  made  contingent on  a worker's  output. 
However,  this is  not true for a1 1 workers.  The  high-productivi  ty workers move 
less often than they would  in  a world without adverse  selection,  while the 
low-productivity workers  may  or,may  not move  less often than they would  in  a 
world without adverse  selection.  There  are two reasons  for this effect,  both 
of which are due  to  adverse  selection.  The  first is identical  to  that in 
Akerlof's model.  Adverse  selection reduces  the future wages  for workers  when 
they move  and  thus reduces  the incentive to  move.  The  second  effect  is due  to 
the posting of bonds  in  equilibrium,  which further reduces  the  incentives for 
mobi lity. 
The  results of this section will  be  shown  with a two-period model  assuming 
that 8 is  uniformly distributed.  For  most  of the results,  these assumptions 
can  be  relaxed.  Without bonds,  the probability that a productivity,  p,  worker 
changes  jobs  is G(w2-p);  the average  probability that a worker  changes  jobs 
is given by  E{G(wz-p))  =  G(wr-E(p))  <  G(O),  where  G(0)  is the 
probability that a worker  would change  jobs  in  a model  without adverse 
selection.  The  posting of  bonds  accentuates  this effect.  In  Example  2  the 
unconditional  probability that a worker moved  was  114,  with the 
lowest-productivity worker  moving one  half of  the  time,  and  the 
highest-productivity worker  never moving. 
Since aggregate mobility is less than in  a model  with complete 
information,  it  is  natural  to  ask  whether  there is  any  potential for  a 
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action,  which one  might argue  does  this,  is  unemployment  insurance.  In  our 
model,  workers  do not incur any  cost if they  change  jobs,  therefore, 
unemployment  insurance cannot  be  directly included in  the model.  However,  it 
can  be  shown  that if the model  is  extended,  so  there is a waiting period that 
workers must  incur when  they change  jobs,  then  introducing unemployment 
insurance  is  identical  to  subsidizing the wages  of job movers.  In  particular, 
this paper  asks  whether  a government  can  achieve a Pareto improvement  by 
subsidizing the wages  of job movers.  Not  surprisingly, if  we  assume  that a 
government  does  not have  superior information about  a worker's productivity, 
the answer  is  no.  This is because  subsidizing mobility would not benefit the 
highest-productivity workers,  therefore,  taxing them  to  pay  for this subsidy 
would make  them  worse  off.  However,  a stronger  welfare  result can  be  proven 
in  this model.  That  is,  a government  cannot  tax wage  income  to  subsidize 
mobi 1  i  ty and  increase aggregate  welfare. '  In  fact, it is shown  that if a 
government  subsidized  the wages  of  job movers  there would  be  no effect on  the 
equilibrium allocations.  This  can  be  seen  most  simply if we  assume  that the 
government has  access  to  lump-sum  taxation.  Without  such  a subsidy,  the 
equilibrium prices and  allocations from Problem  E  are: 
1)  ~=w~+~'/~-E(PIP<PI) 
2)  A =  JG(p~-8'-p>f(p>dp 
3)  W,  =  .fP  'pG(pl-8'-p>f (p>dp/~ 
4)  wI  =  E(plp<pI) -  (1 - A)b 
where, 
E(plp<p,) - pl =  -8'12 
To  verify that subsidizing w,  by s and  taxing first-period income  by 
As  has  no real effect,  consider  the above  equations.  Since  the wage  paid to 
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amount  of the bonus  would  increase by  s (or bonds  would  increase by 
1-s.  In  other words,  the amount  of the bonus  paid to  the job stayers 
would  change  one  for one  with the subsidy on  wz  leaving mobility the  same 
and  thus  implying that the wage  paid by  the firm  to job movers,  wr,  remains 
the same.  Therefore,  second-period  income  would  increase by  s for  both movers 
and  nonmovers,  and  first-period income  would  decrease  by s.  The  following are 
the new  equilibrium allocations: 
1')  b'  =  wZ' +  s  +  8'12 - E(PIP<PI) 
2')  A =  SG(pl-8'-p)f(p)dp  =  A 
3'  >  W,  '  =  fP'p~(pl-8'-p>f(p>dp/h' =  W, 
4')  w,' =  E(plp<pl) -  (1 - A)bl  =  WI -  s 
The  preceding assumed  that a government  had  access  to  lump-sum  taxation, 
that is,  that firms did not take into account  their influence on  tax rates. 
By  changing  the amount  of the bond  that workers  post,  firms can  influence 
aggregate  mobility and  hence  tax rates.  If firms did take this into account, 
then they would  choose  the amount  of the bond  that has  to  be  posted to 
maximize  the expected  return of the highest productivity worker.  The 
following  proposition proves  that even  when  firms take into account  their 
effects on  taxes,  that subsidizing mobility would  have  no effect on  the 
equilibrium allocations. 
Proposi t  ion 3: 
Even  when  a government  does  not have  access  to lump-sum  taxation,  the 
equilibrium prices and  allocations are given by  1')-4'). 
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Following Problem E  the new  equilibrium will be  chosen  to  satisfy 
The  solution to this maximization problem parallels that given in  Appendix 
2  and  is  omitted. 
The  intuition behind this result is straightforward.  Subsidizing mobility 
would benefit the frequent  job movers,  the  low-productivity workers.  In  a 
pooling equilibrium,  however,  the returns to  the highest-productivity workers 
are maximized.  Since  the highest-productivity workers  never move  in 
equilibrium,  they never  benefit from the subsidy.  The  amount  of the bond  that 
would be  posted  in  equilibrium would  change  one  for one  with the amount  of the 
taxes to  eliminate the effects  of  a government's  action.  It  can  be  shown  that 
if the amount  of the bond  does  not change,  then subsidizing mobility could 
increase aggregate  welfare.  (Although it  could not result in  a Pareto 
improvement.) 
It  is informative to  compare  the results of  this model  to  that of 
Jovanovic  (1983)  who  also analyzed a labor market  with adverse  selection. 
Unlike the present model,  he  concluded  there would  be  too much  job mobility. 
To  derive his results,  Jovanovic  assumes  there are an  equal  number  of 
workers  and  islands (or plants).  Each  island is  endowed  with a  given 
productivity,  p,  drawn  from a known  distribution,  f(p).  Workers  are assumed 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyto  be  randomly distributed across  the islands.  Workers  are  identical  except 
they work  at plants with different productivity potentials.  After  working at 
an  island one  period,  a worker  decides  whether  to  continue working at his 
present island,  or to  leave and  select a vacated  island.  Islands are vacated 
because  of either death or because  a worker  decides  to  change  islands.  A 
constant birth-death rate is assumed  so  that a fixed fraction of  plants are 
vacated every period.  This  supplies the necessary noise  to  support an 
equilibrium.  Otherwise,  only the  lowest-productivity plant would be  vacated. 
Workers  at low-productivity plants would  then be  the  job changers. 
Because  of this adverse  selection,  the newborn  will have  a lower productivity 
island on  average,  and  thus  the young  will be  more  likely to  change  jobs  than 
other workers.  Since  the behavior of the newborn  is  fixed,  there will be  too 
much  job mobility because  workers  currently at low productivity plants will 
switch islands,  knowing  that some  of the high productivity plants will also be 
vacated. 
The  crucial difference between  Jovanovic's model  and  the present one  is 
that plants are endowed  with the production technology in  Jovanovic's model, 
while workers  are endowed  with the production technology  in the present 
model.  Jovanovic  also ignores the market  for plants.  If plants could be 
bought  and  sold there would not be  a one  to  one  trade-off between  islands 
vacated due  to death and  those  vacated because  the island was  a 
low-productivity island.  The  price for plants would be  determined analogously 
to  the determination of  the  wage  rates for workers  in  the present model. 
Since plants are immobile and  have  different  production technologies,  there 
will be  too much  job mobility in  Jovanovic's model.  Not  enough  job mobility 
exists in  the present model  because  workers  are endowed  with the production 
technology,  and  plants or firms bid to  attract these workers. 
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In  an  attempt  to  explain several  empirical  regularities of the labor 
market,  adverse  selection was  incorporated  into a standard job-matching 
model.  The  model  showed  that the negative relationship between  turnover and 
wages  is a result of adverse  selection.  Another  prediction of the model  is 
that wages  will increase with tenure  since bonds  are posted in  equilibrium in 
order to  punish job changers  (the. low productivity workers)  and  reward the job 
stayers (the high productivity workers).  Two  examples  were  also constructed 
to  demonstrate  that this model  is  also capable  of  explaining two other 
stylized facts of the  labor market.  The  first is the positive correlation 
between  prior mobility and  future mobility,  and  the second  is the notion that 
wages  for (older)  job changers  may  actually decrease  after each  job change. 
The  model  given in  the paper  is abstract and,  as  such,  cannot hope  to 
adequately explain the many  empirical  facts of  the labor market.  One  such 
fact that the model  failed to  explain is  why  quits lead to increased  lifetime 
earnings when  they occur  early in  the life cycle.  The  major  weakness  of this 
model  (and  similar models)  is that it  concentrates on only one  reason  why  a 
worker might quit his present job.  Bartel  and  Borjas find that the reason  why 
a worker  quit his job has  a significant impact on  earnings.  They  divide quits 
into three categories:  quits due  to job dissatisfaction  (PUSH),  quits 
occurring because  a worker  found a better job (PULL),  and  quits occurring for 
personal  reasons.  They  find that a pull quit implies a significantly higher 
wage  growth,  while a push  quit does  not significantly  affect wage  growth,  and 
that quits due  to  personal  reasons  implies a significant  decrease  in  wage 
growth.  Furthermore,  they find  that quits occuring early in the life  cycle 
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likely to occur  later in  the life  cycle.  This  is a puzzle for this model  and 
traditional  job-matching models,  since  turnover due  to the matching process, 
and  thus  quits due  to  job dissatisfaction,  should occur  early in the  life 
cycle. '  Unl i  ke  the tradi  tional job-matchi  ng  model,  however,  thi  s paper 
explains  why  these movers  should experience  less wage  growth than  job stayers. 
The  findings that persistent mobility among  older men  results in  lower 
wages  appears  to  be  true in the aggregate,  however,  it  is not true for all 
groups  of workers.  Murphy  (1985)  finds that for executives  the opposite is 
true,  that is, an  executive's  earnings  are positively related to  his previous 
job mobility.  The  present model  cannot  explain this,  but it  does  suggest  that 
adverse  selection will be  less important for executives  since they are paid 
more  frequently by  bonuses  and  stock options (which  are forms of contingent 
wage  contracts).  If workers  are paid their realized productivity every 
period,  then an  executive's wage  will be  on the average  his base  productivity 
level.  Even if executives  are not perfectly separated according  to their 
productivity,  adverse  selection will be  less important  since more  information 
is  available about  their base  productivity levels. 
A  full explanation of the relationship between  wages  and mobility would 
have  to include  tenure.  Tenure  could  conceivably be  introduced into the 
previous analysis  in  one  of two ways.  The  role of tenure  in  Jovanovic's 
(1979a)  model  is for workers  to  learn over  time about  the quality of their 
current job matches.  The  second  possibility would be  to  introduce 
firm-specific human  capital into a matching model  as  in  Jovanovic  (1979b). 
These  exclusions were  made  to  increase the clarity  of the analysis,  and 
because  solving the model  with an  arbitrary number  of periods has  proven,  as 
of  this time,  to  be  intractable. 
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additional  implications for mobility and  wages.  If the informational 
requirements  of the model  are modified so  that firms cannot  perfectly observe 
a worker's past wage  rates,  the resulting adverse  selection implies that 
workers  who  move  because  of differences  in  either tasks  (personal  reasons)  or 
technologies  will earn  lower  wages  over  time.  For  example,  if the matching 
component,  8,  is interpreted to  be  the utility  or disutility a worker 
receives at a job,  the above  analysis  implies that workers  who  have  a taste 
for changing  jobs  will earn  less over  time.  Similarly, if workers  quit 
because of unobservable  shocks  to their household production functions,  then 
adverse  selection.wil1 imply that workers  who  drop out of the  labor force 
frequently will also earn lower  wages  over  time.  This  effect complements 
existing explanations for the wage  differential between  men  and  women. 
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Endnotes 
1.  This assumption is not crucial  since observing a worker's  output at a 
previous firm would only give a potential employer a noisy signal of a 
worker's base productivity level. 
2.  G(O> is the probability that a worker moves again after period one and 
G(88'1(1+8))  is the probability that a worker moves after period zero. 
Using the assumption that 8  is uniformly distributed gives the results in 
the text. 
3.  If we keep the assumption that 0=1 ands 8  is uniformly distributed, the 
average wage for a worker with a base productivity level of  p in period zero 
would be p +  E(818<8'18)  =  p - 71168'. 
4.  Jovanovic himself mentions in a footnote that his model cannot explain 
why persistent job movers have lower future wages compared to  the future  wages 
of infrequent job movers. 
5.  This is because the model has more than one period.  In a one period 
model, one could again obtain a separating equilibrium.  Workers would be paid 
a piece rate wage, with the high productivity workers receiving a large 
percentage of their wage in terms of  their realized output at a firm.  In a 
multi-period model a separating equilibrium would not be as easily obtained, 
since the contract a worker accepts in the first period would signal to  all 
future employers the productivity type of the worker. 
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zero and  again  after period one,  the expected productivity of  a worker  who 
changes  jobs after the first  period is  (213X112X1  +  113X1/2X2)/(213X1/2  + 
113X112)  =  413;  the expected  productivity of  a worker  who  changes  jobs  after 
both periods  is (213X2/3X1/2Xl  +  1/3X1/3X112X2~1~2/3X2/3X112  +  113X113X112)  = 
615;  and  the expected productivity of a worker  in  the  initial period is simply 
(112x1 +  112x2)  =  312.  The  wages  reported in  the text can  be  obtained as 
follows:  In  the initial period,  the probability that a worker  stays  at his 
present job is 112,  therefore  wo =  3/2  -(1/2)ob,  =  1019;  similarly,  the 
conditional probability that a worker  changes  jobs after the first period 
given that he  changed  jobs before 419,  is therefore w,  =  413 -  (4/9)ob2 
=  56/45;  and  the wage  for a worker  who  changes  jobs  twice is just his expected 
productivity,  w,  =  716. 
7.  We  are imposing a restriction that bonds  cannot  be  made  contingent on  the 
realized output of  a worker  output.  Bonds  are only allowed to  be  made 
contingent on  a worker's  decision either to  move  or stay at the firm.  The 
more  general  case,  when  the bond  can  depend  on  y,  has  proven  to  be 
intractable.  Intuition suggests  that including this more  general  case  would 
make  it  more  likely that a separating equilibrium will exist,  but if there is 
enough  variability in the  job matching  component,  8,  that a pooling 
equilibrium will still result.  For  the remainder of the paper,  we  maintain 
the assumption  that the return on  bonds  cannot  depend  on y. 
8.  We  ignore  the mechanism  that forces a firm to  honor  its contract with 
workers.  Workers  who  have  a  good  job match  at their current firm  do  not have 
the same  expected  opportunities at  other firms,  so  that competition cannot 
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of the asymmetric information in the model, neither a court system nor other 
workers would know whether a firm had honored its contract with the worker. 
9.  Another effect that will  help the desired result is that workers will 
generally post larger bonds earlier in their life cycle which will  help give 
the desired result.  Example  1  showed an example of this. 
10.  This is in contrast to  the welfare implications of  Akerlof's model  where 
the government could subsidize the trading of  cars and increase aggregate 
welfare in the sense that owners of  the low-quality cars would gain more than 
the owners of high-quality cars would lose. 
11.  The unconditional  probability that a worker quits his job is greater 
early in the life cycle; it is the probability that a worker quits his job 
conditional on his previous quits, which this paper shows is not necessarily 
greater early in the life cycle. 
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This appendix  proves  Lemma  2. 
.  The  proof uses  the reservation property of  ml(p,y,O,l  1,  that is,  the 
worker  will stay (leave) iff y  >  (<> y'.  This reservation property follows 
since dw2(y)ldy  <  1. 
4)  Ema~Cp+B+~b~,w~l 
=  G(w~-P-I~~)w~  +  (I-G(W~-P-~~~)>(P  +  Ib2  +  E(B10  >  w2-p-,b2) 
where, 
The  second  step expresses  the posterior distribution of  p,  when  p  and  8 
are independent.  See  Degroot  (1979)  for details.  The  third step uses  the 
definition of the convolution product. 
The  steps  in  6  are identical to those  before,  except  the following 
identity is  used  in the proof. 
7)  The  proof follows since f(plp+e=y)  is truncated above  by  yr(p)  <  y. 
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Using  constraint I),  Problem E can  be  rewritten as 
max  {E(p> +  O(A-G)b  +  BGw,  +  R(1-G)p  +  ,r-,,-bS8g(8)d8 
b 
s. t. 
constraints  1)  and  2)  hold. 
There  are two cases  to  consider:  when  G(wz-p"-b)  >  0,  and  when  G(w,-pH-b)  =  0. 
The  first case  leads  to  the following first  order  condition: 
Using the definition of  A and  w,  gives: 
Rearranging  gives  the equilibrium amount  of the bond  as  discussed  in  the 
text: 
The  second  part of the maximization problem assumes  that G(w2-pH-b)  =  0. 
Defining pl such  that w,-pl-b  =  -8',  that is,  the  smallest productivity 
that a worker  can  have  and  never  change  jobs,  the following is the relevant 
maximization problem: 
max{E(p)  +  DAb  +  p") 
b 
s.t. 
constraint 1)  holds. 
This  implies the following first-order condition: 
This  implies the second  equation  in the text:  b =  w,  -  E(plp<pl) +  8'12. 
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In  this appendix,  we  prove  the existence of  an  equilibrium for this 
economy.  The  proof is in two major  steps.  The  first step is to  verify that 
there exists a wage  contract which  satisfies conditions  1 - 11  of the 
definition of equilibrium.  The  second  part is to  show  condition 12,  that 
there does  not exist a new  contract which,  if  offered,  could make  positive 
prof i  ts  . 
where, 
imp1  ies, 
implies, 
To  prove  there exists a solution to this set of  equations,  we  must  verify 
compactness  and  continuity.  Compactness  follows  since  p is distributed on  the 
interval  Cp',  p"1.  Continuity follows  since  wl,w,  are continuous  in 
yr(p> (since G  is  continuous),  and  yr(p> =  f(wl,wr)  is continuous  in 
its  arguments.  Therefore,  wl,  w2,  w2(y> are  continuous  in  yr(p> and, 
from the Brower  Fixed Point Theorem,  there exists a solution to  w, , w,(y), 
and  w,. 
We  now  establish that there does  not exist a new  contract that could 
break  the pooling equilibrium.  We  already know  that of  the pooling contracts, 
the only one  which  could be  an  equilibrium is the one  that maximizes  the 
returns of the highest productivity worker. 
The  remainder  of the proof is  as  follows:  First we  show  that for a 
subgroup of the high-productivity workers  to  be  competed  away  in the initial 
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contract implies  that the highest productivity worker  would  never move  after 
the initial period,  and  thus  there does  not exist a contract that could only 
attract a subgroup of the higher-productivity workers.  The  next step  shows 
that a subgroup  of the lower-productivity workers  cannot be  competed  away. 
The  rest of the proof then establishes that a new  contract could not break  the 
pooling equilibrium in the first  period.  The  crux of the proof is to  show 
that the highest-productivity worker of those  who  changed  jobs after the 
initial period will not move  again after the first  period.  Many  of these 
steps  are  sketched because  of  the similarity to  Proposition 2. 
For  a  subgroup  [pH,  p"1 to  be  competed  away,  we  must  have  W'>p)  < 
WHt(p).  Differentiating with respect to  p implies yr(p)  >  yrH(p>.  We 
next show  that V(p"-8')  >  X(pH), or equivalently,  that the 
highest-productivity worker  will not move. 
Since  w,  +  Bhl(l,l)lbz  <  E(p)  this series of inequalities holds 
if p is sufficiently dispersed. 
Therefore,  for p"  to  prefer a new  contract we  must  have  wo +  BV(y)  < 
w,,  +  BV(,(y>.  However,  p' would  also prefer  this contract since 
This  follows since X <  XH.  The  last inequality says  that 
low-productivity workers  would  gain in  the later periods by pretending to be  a 
high productivity worker  in  the initial period. 
To  prove a contract does  not exist which  can  compete  away  a subgroup  of 
the lower productivity workers,  we  note that the highest-productivity worker 
a1 so prefers  thi  s contract. 
which  imp1  ies 
From  Proposition 2  it  is sufficient to show  that the highest-productivity 
job changer  will not change  jobs again,  i.e.  ~~-p~-~b~  < -€I1,  where, 
V(p2-8')  =  X(p2). 
To  prove  this,  we  show  that I  b2 >  w2 -  p'  .  TO  see  that this is 
sufficient,  note  that ~~-p~-~b~  <  PI-p2 when  the above  condition 
holds,  and  that if p'-pz  <  -el,  then V(pl)  >  X(p2) which could never 
be  true. 
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Proceeding  as  Appendix  2  gives  the following first-order condition. 
A1(l  +  bSg(8>G(yr-p>f(p)dplK) 
where  K  =  S(p-w,)g(w,-p-b)G(yr-p)f(p>dp  - SG(w,-p-b>G(yr-p>f(p>dp 
This  implies that the solution to  b satisfies: 
Integrating by  parts and  recalling from proposition 1 that dyr(p)ldp  <  1 
gives  the desired result. 
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